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1. The COVID-19 public health crisis and its effects on the 
European Union
In its 62 years of  existence, the European Union (“EU”) has never faced such 
a major public health crisis with serious socioeconomic-repercussions as those that 
have been triggered by the COVID-19 pandemic.1
As early as December 20192 the pandemic had already spread to the continent 
and its first official cases appeared in January 2020.3 In a few months, the SARS-
CoV-2 virus pandemic led to over 20 million cases in Europe, and nearly 500 thousand 
deaths – with Italy, France, and Spain, alone having over two million citizens infected 
and over 200 thousand deaths.4
The socio-economic impacts forced the Member States to implement emergency 
measures and restrictions of  free movement to curb the spread of  the virus, the 
impact of  which has been severe economically, with a sharp contraction of  their 
economy, resulting in an estimate 11% to 16% GDP contraction in 2020 and the 
average government deficit likely to rise to around 8.5% of  the GDP. 
This is a particularly heavy burden on Member States that already had high 
public debt and deficit levels before the public health crisis, leading to an inability 
by some more vulnerable Member States to respond to the current crisis. Regardless 
of  the high human-to-human transmission recognised by the EU,5 some Member 
States like Italy and Spain were hit earlier and more aggressively by the SARS-CoV-2 
virus pandemic and the economic impacts will be uneven across Member States, 
depending on the countries that got hit earlier, their emergency responses and their 
own economic structure, with the Member States that depend more on sectors like 
tourism being severely affected.
With the economic dependence on the tourism sector, the early public health 
crisis, and the need for harsh emergency measures, it is estimated that Southern 
European States will be more affected by the COVID-19 crisis, without having the 
economic structures to absorb it in the same way.6
1 Pandemics and Public Health Crisis have been challenges for the EU, though they have been 
effectively tackled like the SARS pandemic in 2003 and the Swine Flu pandemic in 2009. Some 
actions were taken at EU level which included measures like the preparation of  Guidance documents; 
Financial Assistance for affected countries; laboratory co-operation and incentives being given to 
further research, which ended up paving the way for the creation of  the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control. See the Report of  the Commission on Measures undertaken by Member 
States and Accession countries to control the outbreak of  SARS, accessed 30 July 2020, https://
ec.europa.eu/health/ph_threats/com/sars/sars_measures_en.pdf. 
2 Some early cases can be traced back to December of  2019, in France and Italy see Michelle Roberts, 
“Coronavirus: France’s first known case ‘was in December’”, accessed 30 July 2020, https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-europe-52526554 and Kate Kelland, “Italy sewage study suggests COVID-19 
was there in December 2019”, accessed 30 July 2020, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-
coronavirus-italy-sewage/italy-sewage-study-suggests-COVID-19-was-there-in-december-2019-
idUSKBN23Q1J9. 
3 See the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control COVID-19 Event Background, 
accessed 30 July 2020, https://www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/novel-coronavirus/event-background-2019. 
4 See the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control data, accessed 30 July 2020, https://
www.ecdc.europa.eu/en/cases-2019-ncov-eueea.
5 See the Council conclusions on Covid19, 2020/C/57/04, accessed 30 July 2020, https://eur-lex.
europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1596190986715&uri=CELEX:52020XG0220(01).
6 See the Commission Staff  Working Document Identifying Europe’s recovery needs Accompanying 
the Document Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European 
Council, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the Regions 
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The COVID-19 crisis affected the EU in an unprecedented way, leading to 
a sudden and quick change in the European citizens’ way of  life, with the sudden 
restrictions on human freedom which only aggravated existing social problems.7
In a matter of  days, Europeans saw their routines and habits change and had 
to adapt to the constant crisis, including in their work lives, with remote working 
becoming the norm almost overnight, especially during lockdown periods, adopted 
by countries at the peak of  the public health crisis. Flexible work regimes, with some 
shifting with telework, also became the norm in the post-lockdown periods many 
countries are facing.
This social and economic shock with severe consequences hit the EU as a 
whole, affecting the global supply chains and causing volatility in financial markets, 
consumer demand shocks, and negative impact in key sectors like travel and tourism.
There is a strong necessity for coordination at the European level and solidarity 
and cooperation among Member States and Regions. Especially with the European 
Single Market function being severely disturbed, and with the Member States 
being unable to cope with the pandemic requiring. Strong public policies that lead 
to harsh emergency measures – like the restriction of  movement, closing borders 
and restricting fundamental rights, leading to a distrust regarding the power of  the 
markets on such emergencies.8
A greater investment by the EU is therefore needed with an ambitious budget 
in order to help the national efforts by the Member States to support the damages on 
the hardest-hit sectors and Regions, ensuring European solidarity.9
With the huge strain on Member States public finances, the European 
Commission and Council activated the general escape clause of  the Stability and 
Growth Pact, granting some necessary financial flexibility to Member States.10
These effects led to further collaboration between Member States and the 
EU’s institutions, and to new developments of  its principles – especially regarding 
Solidarity and Cohesion.
2. The COVID-19 pandemic effects at the European 
subnational level and its challenges and repercussions
The uprising problems of  the COVID-19 pandemic reinforced the need for 
more coordinated European approaches and programs to support Member States, 
along with bigger collaboration among Member States and between Member States 
and the Union, shifting the dynamic balance of  powers and competences at national 
and Union level that comes from the subsidiarity principle.11
Europe’s moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation, SWD(2020)/98/final/2, https://
eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?qid=1596191546287&uri=CELEX:52020SC0098(01).
7 See Joana Aguiar e Silva, “Pandemic and dystopia”, UNIO - EU Law Journal (blog), accessed 2 august 
2020, https://officialblogofunio.com/2020/06/23/pandemic-and-dystopia/#more-4792.
8 See Natalia Millán and Guillermo Santander, “El virus cosmopolita: lecciones de la COVID-19 para 
la reconfiguración del Estado-Nación y la gobernanza global”, Geopolítica(s). Revista de Estudios sobre 
Espacio y Poder, v. 11, no. Especial (November, 2020): 251-263.
9 See The Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, 
the Council, the European Central Bank, the European Investment Bank and the Eurogroup: 
Coordinated economic response to the COVID-19 Outbreak, COM(2020)/112/final.
10 See Communication from the Commission to the Council on the activation of  the general escape 
clause of  the Stability and Growth Pact, COM(2020)/123/final.
11 See T. Schilling, “A new dimension of  subsidiarity: subsidiarity as a rule and a principle”, Yearbook 
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This constant shifting and sometimes tension can also be seen at Member States 
subnational levels, with their productive sectors and the economic consequences 
being different, though the national economic regional consequences and their 
disparities are also unequal among Member States’ Regions, with the disparities at 
regional levels being stronger in Spain then in countries like France, Germany, and 
Italy.12
The lack of  regional coordination, interoperability, and data-sharing as also been 
pointed out as a problem that aggravated the outbreak in decentralised countries like 
Italy,13 with the lack of  collaboration between central and regional powers.
This lack of  collaboration also led to tensions among federated and decentralised 
Member States and to different responses. In Spain, the Basque Country declared 
a public health emergency before any other Region and Catalonia requested a 
complete shutdown of  the Region, including the closure of  air, sea, and land ports. 
The implementation of  measures at the central level led to rising tensions between 
the central government and the Catalonian and Basque countries.14
The German government, on the other hand, despite the possibility of  a 
unilateral state of  emergency that could centralise powers at the federal government 
level, in accordance with Articles 35(2), (3) and Article 91 of  the Grundgesetz, 
avoided making use of  these powers. Instead, the Merkel government and the 16 
heads of  the Länder negotiated a shared set of  guidelines, leading to a commitment.
The German measures against the COVID-19 public health crisis were seen 
as rather successful compared to other countries, albeit some internal tension being 
aggravated.15
In Portugal, on the other hand, the lack of  an agreement between the Central 
and Regional Governments, in particular the Azores Regional Government, regarding 
measures like airport controls and the limiting or suspension of  flights between the 
mainland and the archipelago let to a number of  issues.
This lack of  cooperation created unwanted tension between the central and 
the regional governments, which led to the Autonomous Regions taking harsher 
measures. The Azores implimplemented a forced quarantine to external passengers 
arriving at the Region approved by the Government’s Council Resolution number 
77/2020 of  March 27, and Madeira’s Regional Government enforcing mandatory 
mask-wearing on public spaces with the publication of  its Government’s Council 
Resolution Number 551/2020.
In the Azores’ case, the enforcing of  the forced quarantines, even after the 
State of  the Emergency declared by the Central Government, led to the Portuguese 
Constitutional Court’s Ruling no. 424/2020, Process no. 403/2020, that ruled part of  
of  European Law, v. 14, no. 1 (January, 1994): 203-207.
12 See Elvira Prades Illanes, “Heterogeneidad en el impacto económico del COVID-19 entre regiones 
y países del área del Euro”, Banco de España Eurosistema Repositorio Institucional, accessed 5 
August 2020, https://repositorio.bde.es/bitstream/123456789/12701/1/be2002-art17.pdf.
13 See Fabrizio Carinci, “COVID-19: preparedness, decentralisation and the hunt for patient zero”, 
BMJ, no. 368 (2020), Editorial, https://www.bmj.com/content/bmj/368/bmj.m799.full.pdf.
14 See Helena Legido-Quigley et al., “The resilience of  the Spanish Health System against the 
COVID-19 pandemic”, The Lancet Public Health, v. 5, no. 5 (2020): 251-252.
15 The German federal government’s hesitation might by explained by historical facts like the abuse of  
emergency powers during the final years of  the Weimar Republic, which eroded German democracy and 
contributed to the rise of  Hitler and the Nazi Party. See Markus Siewert et al., “A german miracle? Crisis 
management during the COVID-19 pandemic in a multi-level system”, SSRN Electronic Journal (2020).
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the Government’s Council Resolution as being unconstitutional. Such an outcome 
could have arguably been avoided with more collaboration between the Portuguese 
Central Government and the Autonomous Regions’ Governments.16
The COVID-19 pandemic not only did have its consequences on Member 
States but inside the Member States themselves, at a regional level, with the impact 
also being asymmetric inside some countries.
Despite the tendency for the pandemic to hit larger and concentrated urban 
areas, some rural areas were strongly affected, especially because they were not 
prepared for a crisis of  such magnitude. 
This unpreparedness from some Regions, which also results from the lack of  
investment, support, and proper territorial cohesion policies at a national level, has 
also led to stronger pressure on subnational governments, with the need for increased 
expenditure, especially in the health sector.17
Facing such challenges, there has never been such a strong need for European 
support for the cohesion and regional policies as a way of  supporting their resilience 
for the future.
3. The development of  the European Cohesion Policy and the 
dynamic towards the European Commission’s control
Countering asymmetries and balancing the development among European 
Regions have always been some of  the main goals for the European Cohesion Policy, 
alongside the objectives of  social, economic, and territorial cohesion, as well as the 
modernisation of  the European Economic Space.18
The European approach to a regional policy also ensures there is a way to tackle 
some of  the biggest tensions and some common issues affecting the European 
territory.19 The Commission 2008 Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion also 
reinforced the need for cooperation among Regions to face common problems.20
The issue of  regional disparities was one of  the debate topics among the EU’s 
Founding Fathers, the strengthening of  the social and economic cohesion was seen 
a necessary condition for the establishment of  the Common Market in the Treaty 
of  Rome.21
16 For a deeper analysis regarding the powers and competences of  the Portuguese Republic and it’s 
Autonomous Regions in a State of  Calamity see Tiago Fidaldo Freitas, “A execução do estado de 
emergência e da situação de calamidade nas regiões autónomas – o caso da pandemia COVID-19”, 
e-Pública, v. 7, no. 1 (2020): 44-77 and Isabel Fonseca, João Carlos Costa, Rita de Sousa Costa, Rui 
Castro Vieira and Tiago Sérgio Cabral, “Estudos sobre a organização administrativa das Regições 
Autónomas – Primeiro (estudo sobre) a Administração Pública dos Açores”, in Estudos em homenagem 
ao Professor Doutor António Cândido de Oliveira, eds. Cláudia Melo Freitas, Isabel Fonseca, Joaquim Freitas 
da Rocha and Pedro Madeira Froufe (Coimbra: Almedina, 2017), 465-482. 
17 See OECD, “The territorial impact of  COVID-19: managing the crisis across levels of  government”, 
accessed 12 August 2020, https://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/the-territorial-
impact-of-COVID-19-managing-the-crisis-across-levels-of-government-d3e314e1/.
18 See Riccardo Crescenzi, Ugo Fratesi and Vassilis Monastiriotis, “Back to the member states? Cohesion 
policy and the national challenges to the European Union”, Regional Studies, v. 54, no. 1 (2020): 5-96.
19 See Anastácio Gonçalo, Manuel Lopes Porto and Elisa Ferreira, “Artigo 174.º”, in Tratado De Lisboa: 
anotado e comentado (Coimbra: Almedina, 2012), 733.
20 See Green Paper on Territorial Cohesion Turning territorial diversity into strength, COM(2008)/616/
final.
21 See Mattia Casula, Economic growth and cohesion policy implementation in Italy and Spain: institutions, strategic 
choices, administrative change (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 1.
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Exploring the unique economic and social growth potential and eliminating 
some dependencies and regional issues,22 despite some optimism regarding the ability 
the European Community would have to balance by itself, with its construction, the 
developments of  all European Regions, the plan to deepen the Internal Markets in 
the 1970s and to launch an Economic and Monetary Union ended up revealing the 
necessity for an active cohesion policy to tackle the problems regarding regional 
disparities.23
The need for cohesion, alongside consistency and cooperation, was seen as a 
necessary principle for the transformation of  the Community into a Union and for 
the development of  it as a European Model of  society advocated by Jacques Delors.24
In spite of  some efforts existing in the previous decade and the establishment 
of  the European Regional Development Fund, the major development came in 1988 
with the Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2052/88 of  24 June 1988 on the tasks of  
the Structural Funds and their effectiveness and on coordination of  their activities 
between themselves and with the operations of  the European Investment Bank and 
the other existing financial instruments. 
The funds were concentrated on specific objectives that have been subject to 
change over the course of  the five programming periods, with the EU budgets also 
turning into multi-annual budgets.
Most of  the funding was concentrated on development and structural 
adjustment of  the Regions whose development is lagging – which was referred to as 
objective No. 1 –, the rest of  the funding was used for Community initiatives.
The objectives were subjected to changes in the following programming periods, 
in accordance with the changes in the EU, like the accession of  new Member States, 
the main objective of  developing lagging Regions being unchanged.
The last two programming periods modified the objectives of  the regional policy, 
with the convergence objective replacing the previous objective No. 1 to resolve the 
“micro-zoning” problem, and increasing the investment in the surrounding regional 
areas. 
There has also been a shift in investment towards SME support, innovation, 
more innovative employment and social policies, and the increase of  more European 
influence over the national focus of  these policies.25 This shift was particularly 
notable following the Treaty of  Lisbon with the promotion of  competitiveness as a 
way to address regional, and social inequities and the elevation to a European level 
of  the regional policy.26
 With the Europe 2020 strategy, the financial framework directed the cohesion 
policy towards the objectives of  the strategy, turning into a catalyst for the modernisation 
22 See Ana F. Neves, “O quadro normativo e as vinculações gerais da política de coesão: o 
aprofundamento da condicionalidade”, in Direito público política de coesão e fundos europeus pós-2020, eds. 
Carla Amado Gomes, Ana Fernanda Neves and Miguel Assis Raimundo (Lisboa: Instituto de Ciências 
Jurídico-Políticas, 2019), 11-14.
23 See the “Independent Barca Report”, accessed 19 August 2020, https://ec.europa.eu/regional_
policy/archive/policy/future/pdf/report_barca_v0306.pdf.
24 See The Commission’s programme for 1989 Address by Jacques Delors, President of  the 
Commission, to the European Parliament and his reply to the debate, accessed 20 August 2020, 
http://aei.pitt.edu/7631/1/31735055261915_1.pdf.
25 See the “Sixth report on economic, social and territorial cohesion”, accessed 20 August 2020, 
https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/cohesion6/6cr_en.pdf.
26 See Anastácio Gonçalo, Manuel Lopes Porto and Elisa Ferreira, “Artigo 174.º”, in Tratado De Lisboa: 
anotado e comentado, 731-734.
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of  all the European Regions. This coordinated action focused on common priorities was 
the result of  a reform of  the Cohesion Policy following the debate on how to increase 
its effectiveness, reinforce the governance, and to simplify its management system and 
architecture.
The results of  the expert evaluation network delivering policy analysis on the 
performance of  Cohesion policy 2007-2013 showed there were growing disparities and 
differences among Member States evaluations;27 the independent Barca report proposed 
the strengthening of  the role of  the European Commission;28 and the conclusions of  
the Fifth Report on economic, social and territorial cohesion emphasised the need for 
the Cohesion Policy to cultivate a focus on performance, with programs that have a clear 
strategic vision of  what aims to achieve.29
This led to the reformed EU 2014-2020 cohesion policy that involved a bigger 
role by the EU institutions. The reform followed the independent Barca report’s critics 
regarding the architecture of  the Cohesion Policy, with the lack of  a system of  incentives 
and sanctions to ensure reforms aimed at a strengthening of  the local institutional 
capacity, needed to achieve development, and the proposal of  ex-ante conditionalities or 
a set of  principles or agreements boosting the public accountability of  Member States, 
with the aim of  overcoming the limited goal and result orientation.30
It gave rise to the current Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013 of  the European 
Parliament and of  the Council of  17 December 2013 laying down common provisions 
on the various EU funds, alongside some other Regulations aimed at each particular Fund 
like Regulation (EU) No. 1301/2013 on specific provisions concerning the Investment 
for growth and jobs for the  European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and 
Regulation (EU) No. 1300/2013 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  
17 December 2013 on the Cohesion Fund, among others.
The main features in the reformed Cohesion Policy were the simplification of  the 
rules regarding the access to the funds with some increased flexibility in the organsation 
of  the operational programs and the better thematic focus for priority areas. These 
reforms would allow an improved link between EU priorities and regional needs and 
were considering previous analysis by the Commission regarding the Cohesion policy 
implementation by the Member States.31
The mentioned ex-ante conditionalities were connected to 11 thematic objectives that 
were in Part I of  Annex XI of  Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013, and general ex ante 
conditionalities on the same Annex, in the second part, with minimum requirements in 
terms of  public procurement, poverty targets, education targets, inter alia.
The achievement of  these conditionalities would shape the result-orientation of  the 
new cohesion policy architecture.
27 See “The Expert evaluation network delivering policy analysis on the performance of  Cohesion 
Policy 2007-2013”, Synthesis of  National Reports 2011, accessed 21 August 2020, https://ec.europa.
eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/evaluation/pdf/eval2007/expert_innovation/2011_
synthesis_national_reports.pdf.
28 See Mattia Casula, “Economic growth and cohesion policy implementation in Italy and Spain: 
institutions, strategic choices, administrative change”, 72-73.
29 See “The Fifth Report on economic, social and territorial cohesion”, accessed 22 August 2020, 
https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docoffic/official/reports/cohesion5/pdf/5cr_en.pdf.
30 See Valeria Fedeli et al., EU Regional and Urban Policy: Innovations and Experiences from the 2014-2020 
Programming Period (Cham: Springer, 2020), 15.
31 See Mattia Casula, “Economic growth and cohesion policy implementation in Italy and Spain: 
institutions, strategic choices, administrative change”, 82-83.
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Another feature was the development of  the partnership principle with the 
partnership agreements with Member States having to organise a partnership with the 
competent regional and local authorities, including partners referred in an Article of  the 
Regulation for each partnership and program following a multi-level program approach.32 
This Cohesion Policy reform showed some results with some tendency for regional 
convergence and the reduction of  disparities following an increase as a result of  the 
previous financial and economic crisis, though some regional imbalances have been 
difficult to reverse in some Member States, particularly in Southern Europe.
Nonetheless, coordination and complementarity between national policies and 
the cohesion policy have been increasing, with the need to strengthen the capacity and 
quality of  regional and local governance and a stronger emphasis on coordination and 
coherence of  policies.33
The next developments regarding the European Cohesion Policy would come 
with the 2021-2027 multiannual financial framework, following the May 2018 proposal 
by the European Commission. The negotiations, however, were caught by surprise by 
the COVID-19 pandemic and its sudden effects on the Member States, which resulted 
in sudden quick changes to the current European Structural and Investment Funds 
Regulations, to the need to re-think the new multiannual financial framework and a new 
vision for the European Regional Policy.
The new multiannual financial framework came with Council Regulation (EU, 
Euratom) 2020/2093 of  17 December 2020, with the goal of  facing the COVID-19 
crisis and to provide a long-term financial framework, and paving the way to a fair and 
inclusive transition to a green and digital future, supporting the Union’s longer-term 
strategic autonomy and making it resilient to shocks in the future.34
This Regulation was followed by Council Regulation (EU) 2020/2094 of  14 
December 2020 establishing a European Union Recovery Instrument to support the 
recovery in the aftermath of  the COVID-19 crisis.
4. The European Cohesion Policy’s answer to the COVID-19 
crisis and the paving of  a road towards a flexible policy regarding 
funds
The public health crisis put a tremendous strain on the Member States’ and their 
Regions’ healthcare systems, leading to a significant financial burden for their countries, 
with economies freezing and entire countries going into full lockdown.
The deprived areas were particularly affected with the poorer areas having the higher 
mortality rates and with unprepared Regions having to suddenly increase public spending 
on their healthcare systems and the sudden need to adapt, sometimes to the point of  
having no choice but to stretch their powers and competences to a point of  conflict with 
the central governments as mentioned.35
Some of  the first measures adopted by the EU institutions to fight the pandemic’s 
effects were under the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative (CRII) which altered 
32 See Valeria Fedeli et al., EU Regional and Urban policy: innovations and experiences from the 2014-2020 
programming period, 17-19.
33 See “The Final Report on the study on national policies and cohesion”, accessed 22 August 2020, 
https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/studies/nation_policies_cohesion_en.pdf.
34  See recital of  Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of  17 December 2020 laying down the 
multiannual financial framework for the years 2021 to 2027.
35 See OECD, “The territorial impact of  COVID-19: managing the crisis across levels of  government”.
® UNIO - EU LAW JOURNAL Vol. 7, No. 1,  July 2021
12 Rui Castro Vieira
Regulation No. 1303/2013. The exceptional times caused by the COVID19 crisis resulted 
in the need for additional public resources to support health care systems and other 
activities directly linked to the outbreak of  the disease, as well as the need to support and 
protect Member States’ economies, companies, and workers.36
This exceptional context led to Regulation No. 1303/2013 to be amended by 
Regulation (EU) 2020/460 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  30 
March 2020. The amendment created specific measures to mobilise investments in the 
healthcare systems of  Member States and in other sectors of  their economies in response 
to the COVID-19 outbreak, allowing some flexibility by Member States to use European 
Funds and ensuring that the Member States have sufficient financial means to make 
the investments needed without delay,37 albeit with some limits in accordance with the 
principles of  subsidiarity and proportionality.38
One of  the main amendments was Article 30 (5), allowing Member States to 
transfer during the programming period an amount of  up to 8 % of  the allocation as 
of  1 February 2020 of  a priority, and no more than 4 % of  the program budget to 
another priority of  the same Fund of  the same program, without requiring a decision of  
the Commission amending the program. This amendment resulted in a bigger flexibility 
given to Member States and a more active role being recognized to national institutions 
in their fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.
The Commission’s role, however, was still active with Article 96, paragraph 10 
giving the power to the Commission to adopt decisions, by means of  implementing acts, 
approving all the elements, including any of  its future amendments, of  the operational 
program, with the exception of  the previously mentioned Article, limiting any over-
stretching by Member States regarding operational programs and their funding.
This was followed by many other measures and major changes to EU policies to 
tackle the Public Health crisis.39 
The Commission in its 1st April Communication Coronavirus Response: Using every 
available euro in every way possible to protect lives and livelihoods proposed an economic package 
that included a new EU Solidarity instrument to help workers keep their income and 
help businesses stay afloat and retain staff  known as SURE (Support to mitigate 
Unemployment Risks in an Emergency), and created a new flexible framework for the 
European Structural and Investment Funds, allowing them to be directed at tackling the 
COVID-19 crisis, being able to finance public health efforts or cushion the economic 
blow for people and businesses and with the redirecting of  the annual budget to tackle to 
a new solidarity instrument.40
36 See the Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the Council amending 
Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013, Regulation (EU) No 1301/2013 and Regulation (EU) No 508/2014 
as regards specific measures to mobilise investments in the health care systems of  the Member 
States and in other sectors of  their economies in response to the COVID-19 outbreak [Coronavirus 
Response Investment Initiative] COM(2020)/113/final. 
37 See Recital 8 of  Regulation (EU) 2020/460 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  30 
March 2020.
38 See Recital 11 of  Regulation (EU) 2020/460 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  
30 March 2020.
39 See Armenia Androniceanu, “Major structural changes in the EU policies due to the problems and 
risks caused by COVID-19”, Administratie Si Management Public, v. 34 (2020): 142-144.
40 See the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the European Council, 
the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of  the Regions: 
Coronavirus Response Using every available euro in every way possible to protect lives and livelihoods 
COM(2020)/143/final.
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The new instrument for temporary SURE is a temporary instrument to allow 
financial assistance by the part of  the Union in the form of  loans from the Union 
to affected Member States,41 resulting in Council Regulation (EU) 2020/672 of  19 
May 2020.
The economic package also included a proposal for further amendments 
to Regulation no. 1303/2013 to provide exceptional flexibility for the use of  the 
European Structural and Investments Funds in response to the COVID-19 outbreak 
in order to ensure that all support from the Funds can be mobilised.
This amendment again recognised the active role of  the national and sub-
national institutions exempting Member States from the need to comply with 
thematic concentration requirements, to enable redirection of  resources to the areas 
most impacted by the current crisis, which further, temporarily, reversed some of  the 
Cohesion Policy Reforms of  the current period.
On the other hand, some of  the procedures were even more simplified with the 
limitations to perform necessary audit work. The new measures were complementary 
to the amendments made by Council Regulation (EU) 2020/672 of  19 May 2020 and 
resulted in an exceptional reversal of  the policy reforms and with the Commission 
allowing more flexibility and control by the part of  the Member States.42
Regulation no. 1303/2013 was again amended by Regulation (EU) 2020/558 
of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  23 April 2020 with more 
specific measures to provide exceptional flexibility for the use of  the European 
Structural and Investments Funds in response to the COVID-19 outbreak. With 
the aggravation of  the economic and financial crisis caused by the pandemic, there 
was the need for additional flexibility, which included the exceptional possibility to 
request, for Cohesion Policy programs, a co-financing rate of  100 % to be applied 
for the accounting year 2020-2021.43
This exceptional measure came with the additional Article 25a allowing the 
possibility for Member States to request a co-financing rate of  100 % for one or 
more priority axes in a program supported by the ERDF, the ESF or the Cohesion 
Fund, which would, however, need approval by the Commission.
Articles 25a (2) and (3) also allowed an increased flexibility, with the Member 
States being able to request the transfer of  the resources available for programming 
for the year 2020 between other funds or between categories of  Regions.
These amendments gave the necessary instruments and flexibility for Member 
States and Regions to ensure the necessary measures to combat the negative effects 
of  the COVID-19 crisis.
Further amendments were made to Regulation 1303/2013 with Regulation 
(EU) 2020/1041 of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  15 July 2020 to 
include additional resources for the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI), in order to 
41 See Proposal for a Council Regulation on the establishment of  a European instrument for temporary 
support to mitigate unemployment risks in an emergency (SURE) following the COVID-19 outbreak 
COM(2020)/139/final.
42 See Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the Council amending Regulation 
(EU) No. 1303/2013 and Regulation (EU) no. 1301/2013 as regards specific measures to provide 
exceptional flexibility for the use of  the European Structural and Investments Funds in response to 
the COVID-19 outbreak COM(2020)/138/final.
43 See Recitals 3 and 4 of  the Regulation (EU) 2020/558 of  the European Parliament and of  the 
Council of  23 April 2020.
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reflect the increasing of  resources of  the specific allocation, in accordance with the 
adopted budget for 2020.44
The sudden and exceptional amendments to the European Cohesion Policy 
ended up increasing Member States’ role in the allocation and transfer of  EU 
funds. Despite the past confrontations in the past between the Commission and the 
Member States and the latest tendency for the bigger control by the Commission 
through conditionality, the emergency of  the COVID-19 crisis showed a need for a 
more flexible model for Member States and their national and subnational policies 
regarding the Cohesion Policy. These new flexible arrangements regarding the use 
of  European funds resulted from an increased need to support national policies, 
especially regarding healthcare, with the asymmetrical shocks and challenges faced 
by the Member States. The health crisis in the whole continent further revealed 
the disparities throughout the Union and a need for a more regional approach by 
regional and local authorities and a deepening of  the multi-level governance of  the 
Cohesion Policy.45
5. The EU Recovery Plan and its developments on the 
European Cohesion Policy
The EU’s major Recovery Plan for the continent came with the Communication 
Europe’s moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation. Realising the major risks 
of  an imbalanced recovery, of  an uneven playing field and of  widening disparities, 
a European response is proposed, with fast and flexible support being granted to 
affected Regions under the new REACT-EU initiative.46
The Recovery Plan is also a major investment for the future with the support 
for the European Green Deal and the strengthening of  the Single Market for the 
Digital Age,47 which are major opportunities for the integration and development 
of  Regions in the Single Market and taking advantage of  some Regions’ unique 
potential in the new green economy.
The React-EU initiative, which was proposed as a new amendment to Regulation 
no. 1303/2013 and led to Regulation 2020/2221 of  the European Parliament and 
of  the Council of  23 December 2020 is a new development on the European 
Cohesion Policy with the goal of  also, preventing the widening of  disparities among 
Member States and their Regions during the economic recovery process following 
the pandemic, allowing further development of  flexibility with the use of  EU funds 
aligned with the objectives of  economic recovery and preparing the green, digital 
and resilient recovery of  the economies. This new development allows the Cohesion 
Policy to promote the EU recovery plan and a new vision for the Regions.
44 See Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the Council amending Regulation 
(EU) No. 1303/2013 as regards the resources for the specific allocation for the Youth Employment 
Initiative COM(2020)/206/final.
45 See Riccardo Crescenzi, Ugo Fratesi and Vassilis Monastiriotis, “Back to the Member States? Cohesion 
policy and the national challenges to the European Union”, Regional Studies, v. 54, no. 1 (2019), 5-6.
46  See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, The European Council, 
The Council, The European Economic and Social Committee and The Committee of  the Regions - 
Europe’s moment: Repair and Prepare for the Next Generation COM(2020)/456/final.
47 See Sandra Taylor and Ruth Downes, “The structural funds facilitating the information society”, 
European Policies Research Centre, accessed 23 August 2020, https://www.eprc-strath.eu/public/
dam/jcr:2b999bb8-054c-4819-a07b-325c15c3591c/9.2InformationSociety.pdf.
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A new conditionality is also included with a new thematic objective being added 
“fostering crisis repair in the context of  the COVID-19 pandemic and preparing a green digital 
and resilient recovery of  the economy” that allows a simple programming process and the 
widest possible scope, giving a new flexible mechanism for regional recovery.
This new thematic objective is proposed with the insertion of  a new Article 
92b, albeit keeping some control by the European Commission with the new Article 
92b (4) defining that a Decision, by means of  implementing acts, is needed to set 
out the breakdown of  the additional resources as appropriations from the Structural 
Funds for 2020 and 2021 for each Member State in accordance with the criteria and 
methodology set out in the proposed new Annex VIIa.
Conditionality is also reinforced with Article 92b (8), defining the alignment 
of  the ERD and ESF funds with the new thematic objective that will, however, 
constitute a single investment priority for the programming and implementation of  
the additional resources from the ERDF and the ESF.48
Nonetheless, despite, this reinforcement of  the conditionality in a new thematic 
objective, some new flexibility is given regarding the management of  Funds.
Even before the COVID-19 crisis, the proposal for the next multi-annual 
financial framework for the period 2021-2027 had already emphasised the need 
for flexibility and simplification, in order to allow a Union response to unforeseen 
circumstances and emergency situations, though the proposal was not taking into 
account the possibility of  a crisis of  such proportions,49 some budgetary flexibility 
was proposed.
This form of  response was added in Regulation 2020/2093 with the 
reinforcement of  thematic special instruments to react to these sorts of  emergencies 
such as the European Globalisation Adjustment Fund, the Solidarity and Emergency 
Aid Reserve and the Brexit Adjustment Reserve, to allow a more fast, flexible, and 
direct support to such emergencies.50
Non-thematic special instruments were also added to further enhance flexibility, 
namely the Single Margin Instrument and the Flexibility Instrument to allow some 
malleability, while complying with the multi-annual financial framework ceilings and 
to allow the financing of  specific unforeseen expenditure, taking into account the 
needs for emergency spending.51
Regarding the Cohesion Policy, an online public consultation that took place 
between 10 January and 9 March 2018 considered the reducing of  regional disparities 
its the most important challenge.52 These indicators already showed a need to 
further develop the regional focus, allowing a true convergence, especially within the 
countries.53
48 See the Proposal for a Regulation of  the European Parliament and of  the Council amending 
Regulation (EU) no. 1303/2013 as regards exceptional additional resources and implementing 
arrangements under the Investment for growth and jobs goal to provide assistance for fostering crisis 
repair in the context of  the COVID-19 pandemic and preparing a green, digital and resilient recovery 
of  the economy (REACT-EU) COM(2020)/451/final. 
49 The challenges that were considered were security threats and mass migratory movements that 
resulted from instability in neighbourhood countries.
50 See the Amended proposal for a Council Regulation laying down the multiannual financial 
framework for the years 2021 to 2027 COM(2020)/443/final.
51  See recitals 9 and 10 of  Council Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2093 of  17 December 2020.  
52 See Proposal for a Council Regulation laying down the multiannual financial framework for the 
years 2021 to 2027 COM(2018)/322/final.
53 The 2003 Sapir Report already concluded that convergence was taking place only between Member 
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With the COVID-19 economic shock and the deeply asymmetric recovery 
resulting from the different national and regional outbreaks, the Single Market and 
the financial stability of  the Eurozone were now facing a major problem.
Making use of  the full extent of  the EU budget, the Commission proposed 
the reinforcement of  the 2021-2027 financial framework and the strengthening 
of  the European Recovery Instrument to channel investment quickly to where it 
was needed most, with the Cohesion Policy being crucial for paving the path for 
economic development over longer term and supporting the most affected Regions.
The Proposal for Regulation on the European Regional Development Fund 
and on the Cohesion Fund is amended allowing the ERDF to support the continuity 
of  education and training during the COVID-19 pandemic, with the necessary ICT 
equipment, to reinforce Public Health Care systems and be able to support the 
regional economies strongly dependent on the tourism and cultural sectors.
Article 2 of  the current proposal was also amended to include as specific 
objectives for the ERDF and Cohesion Funds; improving access to inclusive and quality 
services in education, training and lifelong learning through developing infrastructure, including by 
fostering resilience for distance and on-line education and training…” and “…enhancing the role 
of  culture and tourism in economic development, social inclusion and social innovation.” A new 
Article 11a is also proposed to allow temporary measures for the use of  the ERDF 
in response to exceptional and unusual circumstances, allowing the Commission to 
fully extend the scope of  support of  the ERDF to support measures that are strictly 
necessary to respond to such exceptional or unusual circumstances, in particular 
through the financing of  working capital for SMEs in the form of  grants or 
reduce thematic concentration requirements and minimum allocation requirements 
established for sustainable urban development.
Such a measure would come from a Temporary Decision from the Commission 
with the defined period, keeping some of  its authority regarding the management of  
the funds,54 though new steps are given on the simplification and on ensuring a more 
regional focus of  the Funds.
6. The new developments of  the European Cohesion Policy 
and its new opportunities for a new regional outlook in the EU
The COVID-19 pandemic and its different impacts on Regions exposed some 
of  the problems with an inflexible Cohesion Policy, namely during emergency periods 
and the need for a more active interaction by the Member States, as well as an active 
role by their Regions, in a more bottom-up decentralised management.55
The different impacts on some Regions and the problems that have resulted 
from the clash with Member State and even EU policies have also revealed a need 
for a more thematic concentration on the less-developed Regions.56
States, but not necessarily within the single countries, the 2008 crisis also showed the importance of  the 
less developed Regions catching up. For a deeper understand See Mattia Casula, “Economic growth 
and cohesion policy implementation in Italy and Spain: institutions, strategic choices, administrative 
change”, 3-5.
54 See The Amended proposal for a Regulation of  The European Parliament and of  the Council on 
the European Regional Development Fund and on the Cohesion Fund COM(2020)/452/final.
55 See Riccardo Crescenzi, Ugo Fratesi and Vassilis Monastiriotis, “Back to the Member States? 
Cohesion policy and the national challenges to the European Union”, 7.
56 A problem that already was identified before the pandemic crisis, for a deeper understanding see 
Zsolt Darvas, Jan Mazza and Catarina Midoes, “How to improve European Union cohesion policy 
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On the other hand, the economic recovery also provides new opportunities for 
new reforms and the modernisation of  the EU Regional and the Cohesion Policy, as 
well as a new opportunity for Regions to emerge stronger after the crisis and face the 
challenges that come from globalisation.
The COVID-19 crisis and its sudden social changes might have a lasting effect 
on European citizens lives and accelerate a new development on the economy, 
working life and the urban development of  big cities, offering new opportunities for 
Regions that could be potentiated by a decentralised and flexible Cohesion Policy57.
The proposed Recovery Plan Next Generation EU also offers new potentials 
for European solidarity among Member States58 and the development of  Cohesion 
Policy and a new dimension to the European integration and the assurance of  
territorial cohesion aimed at the well-being of  all its citizens.
The New Cohesion Policy 2021-2027 legislative package offers new opportunities 
for the development of  a new and more flexible model for the Member States and 
their Regions with broader policy objectives being defined, the possibility of  financial 
adjustments, a simplified transfer mechanism among instruments and simpler rules 
for thematic concentration.59
Cohesion Policy has contributed decisively to the strengthening of  Regional 
Governments, leading to them having an increased role in the governance of  
the Cohesion Policy itself, as well as an increase in the Member States internal 
coordination. This increased role has been crucial to the development of  regional 
competences and the development of  a multilevel governance necessary for the 
deepening of  the European Integration.60
A better and more developed model for the Cohesion Policy is essential for the 
convergence and Europeanisation of  the Regions, and its success will create a new 
and more resilient Europe.61
for the next decade”, Archive of  European Integration (AEI), accessed 27 August 2020, http://aei.
pitt.edu/100995/1/WP-2019-07.pdf.
57 See Aitor Hernandez-Morales, Kalina Oroschakoff  and Jacopo Barigazzi, “The death of  the city 
Teleworking, not the coronavirus, is making urban living obsolete”, accessed 27 August 2020, https://
www.politico.eu/article/the-death-of-the-city-coronavirus-towns-cities-retail-transport-pollution-
economic-crisis/.
58 For a deeper understanding of  the Principle of  Solidarity in the EU see Alessandra Silveira, “We 
are all in the same boat! On the legal principle of  solidarity and its legal implications in the recent 
CJEU case law”, UNIO - EU Law Journal (blog), accessed 27 August 2020, https://officialblogofunio.
com/2020/04/07/we-are-all-in-the-same-boat-on-the-legal-principle-of-solidarity-and-its-legal-
implications-in-the-recent-cjeu-case-law/#more-4648.
59  See “The simplification handbook in cohesion policy 2021-2027”, accessed 10 February 2020, 
https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/sources/docgener/factsheet/new_cp/simplification_
handbook_en.pdf.
60  See Arjan H. Schakel, “Multilevel governance in a ‘Europe with Regions’”, The British Journal of  
Politics and International Relations, v. 22, no. 4 (2020): 767-775. 
61 See Dana Dobrić Jambrović and Mariela Marešić, “The Subnational Dimension of  Europeanization”, 
Review of  European and Comparative Law, v. XLII, no. 3 (2020): 7-28.
